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Come Out to Show the Split Subject: Steve 
Reich, Whiteness, and the Avant–Garde
Siarhei Biareishyk
Steve Reich’s Come Out (1966) begins with articulated speech—a mere sen-
tence—and in the span of 12 minutes and 54 seconds, by way of looping and 
phasing, it deteriorates into utter noise. Come Out is a tribute to the Harlem 
Six case (1964) in which six African–American youths were falsely accused 
of murder. The voice in the composition belongs to one of these six men, 
Daniel Hamm; the noise at the end is a product of Reich’s experimentation 
in the development of what was then a new avant–garde technique. Jacques 
Attali theorizes music as an “organization of noise,” arguing that music is 
“inscribed between noise and silence, in the space of the social codification” 
(Attali 11;20). In order to transcend the musical tradition and its own time, 
many avant–garde composers appeal to this sphere of noise—a sphere 
identified as the “Other” of music; through the composer’s intervention, such 
noise becomes the avant-garde’s music. In Reich’s Come Out, the composer 
ostensibly identifies the noise as the signifier in the sphere of technology, 
namely, in tape recordings; and yet, one must insist on the question, why 
is the recorded voice that of a black man—of the domain that whiteness 
constructs as its Other? As I will argue, this sphere of noise, for the avant-
garde musician, shares functional equivalence with what Jacques Lacan 
theorizes as the function of the “big” Other. It is nevertheless necessary to 
insist that the Lacanian field of the Other is a battery of signifiers; it is the 
field of the symbolic order that is understood as the Other of being, which 
is by no means synonymous with racial Otherness. If the Lacanian Other 
then overlaps with racial Otherness, as I contend it does in the case of Steve 
Reich’s Come Out and the avant–garde music more generally in a greater 
scope, it is a result of historical contingency and not structural necessity. But 
this historical contingency is a reason enough to insist relentlessly on the 
conditions of such historical manifestation; one must question all the more 
“Through the effects of speech, the subject always realizes himself more in the 
Other, but he is already pursuing there more than half of himself. He will simply 
find his desire ever more divided, pulverized, in the circumscribable metonymy 
of speech.”
– Jacques Lacan





rigorously: why, in the development of the Western avant–garde music does 
the field of the Other fall on the voice of racialized Otherness? What is the 
function of this Other in reconstituting a subjectivity in crisis? 
These are just a few of the questions that I address in this essay as I in-
terpret Reich’s Come Out within a ternary constellation of whiteness studies, 
theories of the avant–garde, and psychoanalysis. I demonstrate a functional 
isomorphism between the constitution of the contemporary whiteness 
subjectivity considered by Wiegman and the subjectivity of the avant–garde 
(developed through both Bürger and Groys), while locating both cases as 
a manifestation of an ontological split in the constitution of the subject of 
secular modernity (Lacan). This homology is most succinctly summarized 
in the fact that the subjectivity in question—both the avant–garde and 
that of contemporary whiteness—seeks to transgress its own constitutive 
condition; in other words, it attempts to negate that which defines it at the 
most profound level. The psychoanalytic approach furthermore allows 
one to interrogate the necessity of such a split, yet it also accounts for the 
contingent and historical dimensions of the split manifested in the subject’s 
transferential investment in racialized Otherness. A close reading of Reich’s 
exemplary text, Come Out, demonstrates the function of racial otherness at 
work both in the development of the avant–garde music, as well as in the 
reconstitution of contemporary whiteness. 
Constructing non–racist white subjectivity, retaining its privilege
In his essay “A Report from Occupied Territory,” James Baldwin describes 
the overwhelming presence of the police as a physical means of control 
over African Americans and Puerto Ricans in 1964 Harlem—a situation 
characteristic of other major cities throughout the Unites States at that 
time. Baldwin illustrates the function of the law as representing whiteness, 
whereby the senseless violence against racial minorities serves as a token of 
power that seeks to subdue and to maintain the dominance of whiteness in 
the United States. Baldwin insists that the police in Harlem “are present to 
keep the Negro in his place and to protect white business interests, and they 
have no other function” (Baldwin 1966). These conditions determine the 
context for the case known as the Harlem Six, in which six African–American 
youths were falsely accused of the murder of a Jewish storekeeper. After 
the arrest, the accused were brutally beaten and forced to confess to the 
murder; the outcome of the initial trial resulted in life sentences, in which 
the authorities denied each of the accused independent representation. The 
actions of the police in arresting the young men in the Harlem Six case and 
subsequently submitting them to torture explicitly represents the broader 
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function of the power apparatus of whiteness. Reich composed his Come 
Out—an early work seminal to Reich’s career to be recognized as a major 
Western composer—as a part of a benefit concert that raised funds so that 
the youths could afford an independent lawyer. Yet, one is left wondering: Is 
Come Out merely a testament to the legacy of the Harlem Six, or is it much 
more telling about the developing sound of avant–garde music of the time? 
As a result of the benefit show, in which Reich was one of many partici-
pants, enough money was raised for a retrial of the accused, this time with 
independent representation in court. The Harlem Six case was dropped after 
it came to light that the evidence used in the original trial was fabricated—the 
case, along with other significant civil rights cases during this period, grew 
to symbolize the corruption and racial discrimination of the judicial system 
in New York and the United States (Gopinath 2009:121–128; Reich 2002e: 
22). In Come Out, Reich chooses a single sentence from hours of recorded 
interviews with all six of the accused juveniles as the only material for the 
entire composition. The recorded voice of Daniel Hamm, one of the Harlem 
Six, says: “I had to, like, open the bruise up and let some of the bruise blood 
come out to show them.” Whereas Hamm’s voice is directly audible in the 
utterance, the work also entails the latent voice of the composer—a voice 
embedded in the structure of the piece, inaudible but nonetheless present in 
the compositional choices of the author in manipulations of Hamm’s state-
ment. Running parallel to the relation between Hamm’s voice and Reich’s 
authorial choices in the musical composition is the relation of their respective 
positions in society. Whereas the Harlem Six find themselves on trial largely 
judged based on the black identity of the accused, Reich’s compositional 
choices—not unlike the function of whiteness—remain invisible/inaudible, 
despite their ubiquitous presence. 
 While the privilege of whiteness and racism are not to be thought apart, 
considering the relation between Reich and Hamm’s voice shifts the question 
to the privilege of whiteness and the construction of non–racist white sub-
jectivity. Robyn Wiegman locates the desire for non–racist white subjectivity 
as predominant in contemporary whiteness and, furthermore, articulates 
this problem in the context of whiteness studies in the academy as the limit 
case of contemporary whiteness. Because the main critique lodged against 
whiteness has localized its privilege in its assumption of invisibility and 
universality, Wiegman locates the predominant strategy of whiteness studies 
in the construction of a non–racist white subject in that it seeks to expose 
whiteness as particularity, thereby denying its status of an empty category. 
Yet Wiegman also points to the fact that this desire is in part complicit in the 
perpetuation of white privilege, insofar as it is a component in the structural 
constitution of contemporary white subjectivity. Wiegman describes this 
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contemporary white subjectivity as split “between disaffiliation from white 
supremacist practices and disavowal of the ongoing reformation of white 
power and one’s benefit from it” (120). She then proceeds to demonstrate that 
the two sides of the split—the first, non–racist particularity, and the second, 
universal privilege of whiteness—are codependent. As Wiegman points out, 
“the political project for the study of whiteness entails not simply rendering 
whiteness particular but engaging with the ways that being particular will 
not divest whiteness of its universal epistemological power” (150). Thus, the 
mission of contemporary whiteness studies to diffuse racism may surface 
as yet another manifestation of an attempt to construct contemporary 
non–racist whiteness, whereby even in rendering whiteness as particularity 
it unwittingly reconstitutes whiteness as a category of privilege. In all this, it 
is crucial to note the formal paradox underlying contemporary whiteness: 
the construction of a non–racist white subjectivity seeks to disavow the 
very condition (racism and white privilege) that constitutes this subjectivity. 
Theorizing the avant–garde
The structure of the split in contemporary whiteness that Wiegman describes 
can be further located, in a subtler way, in Reich’s Come Out. While it is 
also true that Reich does share the sentiment of contemporary whiteness 
that seeks to construct a non–racist white subject, more importantly, the 
parallel between Reich’s composition and contemporary whiteness is one 
of functional equivalence, rather than of composer identity. This functional 
equivalence becomes evident if Come Out is considered in the context of 
developments in twentieth–century Western classical music belonging to 
the avant–garde tradition. Reich’s work is usually discussed as pivotal to 
the development of the American minimalist music emerging in the 1960s 
(incidentally, the very period to which Wiegman traces the advent of the 
phenomenon of contemporary whiteness in question); along with the music 
of La Monte Young, Terry Riley, and Philip Glass, Reich’s work belongs to 
a greater tradition of radical aesthetic practice going back to the historical 
European avant–garde. Peter Bürger, in his book Theory of the Avant–Garde, 
characterizes “avant–garde” not according to a certain style, but rather as an 
attack on the function of art as an institution which guarantees “apartness of 
the work of art from the praxis of life” (25). A double paradoxical objective 
outlines the avant–garde’s ambition to destroy the art institution: that art 
become integrated in the praxis of life and at the same time that it escape the 
means–ends rationality of the social order (1984:49). Paradoxical, because 
the means–ends rationality altogether defines the social life praxis of the 
bourgeois world: the injunction to introduce art in the praxis of life signals 
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the contradiction of the original demand that art remain outside means–ends 
rationality. This is but one manifestation of an irreducible split—one, I argue, 
that is the formal condition of avant–garde subjectivity. 
While Bürger claims that his analysis only applies to the historical 
avant–garde movements and their failure (in particular, Dadaism, early 
Surrealism, and Russian avant–garde), the post–World War II “neo–
avant–gardes” nonetheless inherit avant–gardiste gestures by the token of 
similarity in their constitutive structure (109). It is unclear whether the task 
of the avant–garde in the music scene of 1960s New York can be said to be 
the same as that of the historical avant–garde—whether, indeed, the main 
emphasis lies in integrating art in the praxis of life; the fact that Come Out 
was produced as a part of the benefit concert for social justice would certainly 
point this way.1 One thing, however, remains clear: Reich’s work shares the 
ambition of overstepping the limits of its own immediate context, and the 
disparateness of “institutionalized art” and “life” is merely one aspect of this 
context, even if it is not central to Reich’s work. I argue therefore that it is 
not despite the failure of the historical avant–garde (as Bürger would have 
it) that post–WWII experimental music shares its gestures, but because 
of the failure to integrate art and life praxis. As the consequence of this 
failure the two spheres still remained radically separated in the post–WWII 
aesthetic terrain. More importantly, however, avant–garde music in 1960s 
New York still shares a formal split present in the historical avant–garde, and 
therein lies the structural homology with contemporary whiteness: much 
like contemporary white subjectivity, avant–garde seeks to transgress the 
constitutive condition of its own subjectivity.
In his essay “Weak Universalism,” Boris Groys claims that characteristic 
of the avant–garde is an attempt to transcend its own time by means of 
destruction and reduction. Drawing on Giorgio Agamben and Walter 
Benjamin, Groys aptly points toward the avant–garde’s similarity to mes-
sianic knowledge—“knowledge of the coming end of the world as we know it” 
(4). While Groys insists on the centrality of “contracting time,” and its use in 
avant–gardiste strategies, what this conception reaffirms is that what Bürger 
calls the attack on the art institution can be understood as the avant–garde’s 
self–annihilating gesture—the end of its own world as it knows it. No doubt, 
Reich’s Come Out shares this discourse of “weak signs” of messianic knowl-
edge that “impoverishes, empties all our cultural signs and activities” (ibid). 
The aforementioned split of the avant–garde is reflected in its dual position 
of belonging and not belonging to its historical moment: the avant–garde 
attempts to transcend its own time, but nonetheless appears in the context of 
its time, thereby, as Groys argues, engendering both clarification and confu-
sion with regard to its own temporal/spacial location. “Clarification,” Groys 
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writes, “because it revealed repetitive image patterns behind the changes 
in historical styles and trends; but also confusion, because avant–garde art 
was exhibited alongside other art production in a way that allowed it to be 
(mis)understood as a specific historical style” (2010:9). The avant–garde 
must repeat its self–annihilating gesture as a response to the necessary 
institutionalization of its practices (for instance, its exhibition in a museum 
alongside other historically specific art); it must perpetually renew itself by 
means of negating its immediate context. Although Bürger heralds the end 
of the avant–garde with its initial failure, the same structure necessarily 
resurfaces. As Groys notes, “weak, transcendental artistic gesture could not 
be produced once and for all time,” it must be repeated in a different manner 
(ibid). I maintain that Reich’s Come Out must be understood precisely as 
one of these avant–gardiste repetitions, as an attempt to interrogate and 
annihilate the conditions of its own historical embeddedness.
The avant–garde’s anti–institutional stance, emphasized in Bürger’s ac-
count, thus can be understood in a broad sense, if “institution” connotes the 
material conditions defining art at a given historical moment. Consequently, 
institutionalization is a process, one which divests the avant–garde’s reductive 
gesture of its negating force by incorporating a radical practice as a norm 
belonging to the history of art—as Groys would have it, “every … discovery of 
the unoriginal was understood as an original discovery” (7). In this respect, 
institutionalization once again necessitates the avant–garde’s renewed “weak 
sign” that would signal the annihilation of the world (i.e., institution) as we 
know it. But in this formal characterization of the avant–garde, one must 
specify that this discourse centers on the practice of Western art, and that the 
avant–garde composer seeks to transgress the institutionalization of what has 
historically been designated as traditionally Western, whose producers have 
been not only white but also predominantly male. Western classical music 
has come to occupy the position of universal epistemological power—often 
implicitly determining what counted as music and what counts as noise. 
Richard Dyer would call this a position of whiteness. What is at stake is 
not simplification of nominalistic arguments about positive entities (e.g., 
avant–garde, whiteness, experimental music), but rather the elucidation of 
the relational functions of institutionalization, transgression, transcendence, 
and self–annihilation. With the advent of the avant–garde, the historical 
manifestation of these relational functions gain racial specificity, and, as 
becomes evident in Reich’s work, occupy a central role in its constitution. 
Hence the central question: what role does racial otherness play in negoting 
the split constitutive of avant–garde subjectivity? 
Siarhei Biareishyk
79
Ontological split and the subject of secular modernity
The split that Wiegman identifies in the contemporary white subject and the 
one that defines Western avant–garde subjectivity are just two instances of 
the manifestation of the ontological split that, according to Jacques Lacan, 
characterizes the subject of secular modernity. This split is produced by 
the movement Lacan calls alienation, which results from a forced, losing 
choice that can be formalized as possibilities inscribed into two overlapping 
sets (Figure 1). These two sets are joined by the token of having at least one 
common element—the common element being a necessary condition to the 
totality of each set. Thus, because of the forced choice, the common element 
is necessarily lost upon the decision, meaning that the choice “has as its 
consequence neither one, nor the other [set]” (Lacan 211; emphasis in the 
original). The split emerges as the vacillation of the subject between being 
and meaning—constituting two overlapping sets—due to the introduction 
of the signifier. Lacan stresses the point that the signifier is “that which 
represents a subject,” not for another subject, but “for another signifier” 
(207). The signifier that represents the subject emerges in the field of the 
Other, in language, wherein meaning can be located.2 Consequently, “if we 
choose being, the subject disappears, it eludes us, it falls into non–meaning” 
(Lacan 211). If, on the other hand, we choose meaning, because there is 
something in being that always eludes language, “it is of the nature of this 
meaning,” Lacan says, “to be eclipsed by the disappearance of being” (211).
The split in the subject of the Western avant–garde musician can be 
mapped out in the opposition of the Western musical tradition and the 
avant–garde as realized in the field of the Other (Figure 2). The avant–garde 
musician must maintain the split as both a Western composer, and as the 
one who transcends traditional Western musical norms. When choosing 
Figure 1: Lacan 211.
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the avant–garde as otherness, as the transgression of the Western tradition, 
the subject loses its constitutive part as a Western musician. Hence, because 
the Western tradition has defined the composer on the most profound level, 
choosing the avant–garde triggers the disappearance of the subject’s being as 
a musician. The other choice—the side of the Western tradition—leaves the 
avant–garde composer eclipsed, losing the desire for innovation imperative 
for avant–garde tradition. In this way, whatever the choice, the Western 
avant–garde musician remains doubly lacking: neither a Western musician 
(since the musician in question must transcend the present conditions of 
art), nor avant–garde musician (since avant–garde positions itself outside 
of what Western canon defines as “music”). This disappearance occurs with 
the introduction of a signifier that represents a subject; Lacan emphasizes 
that the emergence of this signifier, insofar as it represents the subject for 
another signifier, devoid of meaning in itself, functions in its signification 
only to “reduce the subject in question to being no more than a signifier, 
to petrify the subject in the same movement in which it calls the subject to 
function, to speak, as subject” (207). The question then arises, in the scheme 
that I outline: what is the signifier that represents the avant–garde musician 
as subject, which calls it to speak, to compose, and at the same time marks 
the subject’s own fading?
Attali’s insight that music must be understood as an “organization of 
noise” proves useful in answering this question. Prior to the moment that 
music is to emerge as organized noise, however, comes the noise—not yet 
music, but a signifier that simply points to more meaningless signifiers. 
Attali writes: “music localizes and specifies power, because it marks and 
regiments the rare noises that cultures, in their normalization of behavior, 
see fit to authorize” (21). In other words, music, as the organization of noise, 
is the process of conjuring meaning in the proliferation of the signifiers in 
Figure 2: My adaptation of Lacan’s diagram.
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the field of the Other—the meaning that arises at the cost of certain repres-
sion, normalization, and constitution or assumption of authority. It must 
be ascribed to the task of the Western music institution, understood in the 
broadest sense possible, to bestow value on musical organization, designating 
certain sounds as appropriate for the musical canon while marginalizing and 
devaluing other sounds as non–music. Hence, the Western music institution 
must be understood as a totality of everything that is considered music—a 
totality constituted by the exclusion of everything deemed to be noise. 
Although this division is simplified, the duality of inside and outside must 
be in place for the avant–garde to appeal to noise in order to transcend the 
musical formations of its own time. In this sense, this emergence of music 
from noise does point to Lacan’s field of the Other. It is possible now to return 
to the question posed in the introduction: if the Lacanian Other has nothing 
to do with racialized otherness, why do the functions of the two overlap in 
the case of the avant–garde music? Thus, the hypothesis: it is because the 
Western classical music institution prior and to the point of 1960s (and at 
least until the 1990s) was heavily driven by white males that the noise in 
the Other may be thought to be located in non–Western or racially specific 
music. It is by way of noise that the latter becomes the signifier for which 
the subject (the white Western classical composer) is represented to another 
signifier (more noise)—the very signifier that calls the subject to compose as 
an avant–garde musician and at the same time splits the subject, triggering 
its disappearance as a musician.
Split in the process of alienation, the subject recovers its being through 
desire, in the movement subsequent to alienation, which Lacan designates 
as separation. In its disappearance, the subject is lacking (being), which 
marks a point at which desire emerges. For in addition to the lack of its own 
eclipsed being, the subject locates a lack in the field of the Other—this gap 
in the Other is the lacking meaning, the fact that the signifier representing 
the subject has no fixed signified. Lacan illustrates the lack of the Other in 
the subject’s reaction to the message that it receives from the Other: “He is 
saying this to me, but what does he want?” (214). He is saying to me “I like 
the way your stuff sounds,” but what does he want (me to be)? It is clear, 
therefore, that the desire that emerges in the subject is the desire of the 
Other, but only as an unknown, as lacking. The separation then proceeds as 
a superimposition of the two lacks: “the subject . . . brings the answer of the 
previous lack, of his own disappearance, which he situates here at the point 
of lack perceived in the Other” (214). Confusing its own lack for the lack 
in the Other, the subject is able to imagine the Other’s desire as its own. In 
order to find its own desire in the field of the Other, however, the subject has 
to make a leap: the meaning and the certainty that the subject has to posit is 
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essentially ungrounded. The lack of ground in the formation of subjectivity 
must be repressed–repression in the domain of the unconscious. The sense 
in the field of the Other, therefore, comes with the cutting off of the original 
non–sense, which splits the subject in the first place. By analogy, in order 
for music to emerge, the noise as non–sense that is the original signifier 
has to be repressed, for what we designate as music is noise with meaning 
attached to it. From the point of this leap, of this repression, having given 
up the non–sense, the subject emerges as the subject of the unconscious.
Subject looking for his certainty: singularity, transference, racial 
otherness
In this light, “Steve Reich” transpires as a text—as a subject of the uncon-
scious—defined by the network of signifiers that determine him as a Western 
avant–garde composer from the outside. Because the unconscious emerges 
as a result of the leap in the subject’s relation to the signifier, to the symbolic 
order, Lacan says that “the unconscious is the discourse of the Other . . . it is 
outside” (131). “The unconscious,” Lacan continues to argue, “has already in 
its formations . . . proceeded by interpretation” (130). Although the signifiers 
in the world determine the subject on the most profound level, because 
the interpretation of these signifiers is not objectively predetermined, the 
subject arises as a singularity, which precludes complete immersion in a 
single symbolic order. In other words, although the signifier that is outside 
determines the subjectivity of the composer, the latter is not reduced to 
the outside that determines him; in the formation of the unconscious the 
composer already provides a singular interpretation of the constellation 
of signifiers that determine him. “Singularity,” Kojin Karatani writes, “has 
nothing to do with bourgeois individualism; paradoxically enough, singu-
larity is inseparable from society, from being ‘in between’ communities” 
(152). That is precisely the position that avant–garde subjectivity attempts 
to occupy and sustain—a position of both, belonging and not–belonging, 
of the transcendence of immediate present and the necessity of belonging 
to this present. Although Reich belongs to a community as a Western 
composer—community understood as “a space enclosed within a certain 
system of rules”—the traditional values of Western music no longer can fill 
the split in his subjectivity (1995:133). 
Whether Reich’s attempt to transgress the space of his community can 
be judged successful or not, what is undeniable is the persistence of the 
desire to navigate the space “in between” communities—whether by the 
use of jazz, African music, or new technology in classical composition, or 
by means of Daniel Hamm’s voice. What defines the singularity of Reich’s 
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own composition—what he called “music as a gradual process”—is the 
influence Reich derived from the field of the racialized Other. During his 
college years in the mid–1950s Reich had already begun studying African 
music at Cornell University while completing his masters in jazz. This 
influence persisted through his early works and resulted in a trip to Ghana 
in the summer of 1970 to study drumming with musicians from the Ewe 
tribe. In addition to taking drumming lessons, Reich recorded the lessons 
and transcribed the rhythmic patterns of Ewe drumming, which he later 
incorporated into his own scores. Reich also studied Balinese Gamelan in 
1974 and 1975 in order to explore the rhythmic structures inherent in this 
music. In his article “Steve Reich and Discourse on Non–Western Music” 
Sumanth Gopinath demonstrates that Reich’s interest in non–Western music 
was by no means an exception in his social milieu; in fact, other pioneering 
minimalist composers of the time, such as Glass, Riley, and La Monte Young, 
showed deep interest in non–Western music. Gopinath further notes that 
Reich’s immediate context was instrumental to a shift that occured in his 
music during the 1970s, marked by the composition Drumming (1970): “The 
historical moment is also central to Reich’s career, redirecting his endur-
ing preoccupation with (and possible self–definition through) The Other, 
from an ‘internal other’ (African Americans) in his pieces of the early to 
mid–1960s to an ‘external other’ (West Africans) in Drumming and beyond” 
(Gopinath 2001:141). What is significant is the sheer persistence in Reich’s 
search for otherness as a means to negate the community that constitutes 
him as a composer. While Reich is just one such case among others, I treat 
him as exemplary in demonstrating this movement in the formation and 
development of avant–garde subjectivity in negotiating and sustaining its 
own split. But it is not enough to demonstrate mere appeal to the sphere of 
otherness, it is important to ask: how, and by what means does the formation 
of avant–garde subjectivity proceed? What types of mechanisms are at work 
in this movement toward racialized otherness in the formation of Western 
avant–garde music and in the work of Reich in particular?
In “Non–Western Music and the Western Composer” (1988) and other 
articles and interviews, Reich continuously emphasizes that his interest in 
studying non–Western music does not lead him to absorb a non–Western 
sound.3 He writes, “I didn’t want to sound Balinese or African, I wanted to 
think Balinese or African” (Reich 2002b:148). In making this distinction, 
Reich outlines his usage of what he learned through non–Western music: he 
refuses to absorb the non–Western scales or instruments, but by studying 
the structure of non–Western music he finds new venues for a contemporary 
Western sound to develop. “The structure remains,” says Reich regarding 
the rhythmic patterns in African drumming and Balinese Gamelan that he 
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chooses to borrow and use in his composition, “but the sound is (hopefully) 
new and expressive of the times and place the composer lives in” (Reich 
2002b:149).
The influence of non–Western music illustrates Reich’s relationship to the 
racialized Other, and locates Reich in what psychoanalysis calls transference 
[Übertragung] with this Other. Transference emerges as means to resolve 
the split induced in alienation; Lacan emphasizes that “[t]ransference is 
established with the emergence of the subject who is supposed to know” 
(232). Transference must be understood as an intersubjective formation 
emerging with an appearance of the desired (and imagined) knowledge in 
the Other; it is through this sphere, Lacan emphasizes, that the subject seeks 
to derive its certainty in filling the split induced by the signifier. It must be 
noted that transference is both the cause and the effect of the unconscious 
formations. Hence, if this peculiar position of the subject of the unconscious 
is to be articulated, it is in the analysis of transference. As Lacan argues, it 
is only through the encounter with the Other who is supposed to know, in 
the phenomenon of transference that the unconscious becomes accessible: 
“this primary position of the unconscious that is articulated as constituted 
by the indetermination of the subject—it is to this that transference gives 
us access” (129). Because the subject is determined from the outside, ac-
cording to signifiers in the world, the famous Lacanian formula follows: 
“the unconscious is structured like a language” (Lacan 20; emphasis in 
the original). Thus, the telling of the subject’s unconscious as singularity 
through transference is also telling of political and ideological structures 
of the signifiers that determine the subject. Consequently, insofar as Reich 
as a singularity is subject of and to contemporary Western classical music 
and, on a broader scale, the subject of and to whiteness, his unconscious is 
telling of these structures. It is these structures that I will try to explore in 
the manifestations of transference in Reich’s music. 
Come Out belongs to a formative stage of Reich’s compositional develop-
ment. Today this piece is marketed in a collection under the title of “Early 
Works,” just as the scholarly literature on Reich places it in the “early” stage 
of Reich’s composition, characterizing the piece as a precondition to his 
more complex and influential work. The late 1960s, therefore, is a period that 
illustrates Reich’s pursuit for a style, which would determine him as a Western 
avant–garde composer; this period in Reich’s life can be said to coincide 
with what Lacan terms as “a subject looking for his certainty”–that is, the 
process by which the subject learns to negotiate the split in his subjectivity. 
The early pieces more than any others, therefore, show how the subject is 
able to deal with the alienation induced by the necessity to transgress the 
tradition that defines that subject—the necessity present in both, the split 
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of the avant–garde as well as the subjectivity of contemporary whiteness.
Indeed, through the tape loops, particularly in Come Out and It’s Gonna 
Rain—the latter of which is another tape piece recorded a year earlier that 
features the voice of Brother Walter, a black preacher—Reich discovers the 
process of repetition with complex rhythmic patterns that he would later 
adapt to acoustic instruments, incorporating them into his scores. Reich 
writes, “What tape did for me basically was on the one hand to realize 
certain musical ideas that at first just had to come out of machines, and on 
the other to make some instrumental music possible that I never would have 
got to by looking at any Western or non–Western music” (Reich 2002c:54). 
Whereas it is true that phasing in tape loops allowed Reich to adapt the same 
technique to acoustic instruments, it is also significant that in order for Reich 
to recognize new musical patterns in his tape pieces rather than mere noise, 
he already had to have studied and recognized the patterns in West African 
drumming. Although Reich’s intensified engagement with Ewe music and his 
trip to Ghana with the purpose of learning West African drumming date to 
1970 (several years after the composition of Come Out), his engagement with 
non–Western music prior to this time is well documented.4 West African 
drumming makes use of the downbeats that do not coincide, a possibility 
previously not explored in Western classical music. This is, incidentally, the 
innovative structure that Reich achieved through phasing in tape loops—the 
divergent speeds at which Reich plays two tape loops simultaneously cre-
ates the effect of non–coinciding downbeats constitutive of West African 
drumming. In other words, Reich’s technique that innovates or transgresses 
the tradition that defines him emerges by means of implicit interiorization 
of otherness: first, identification with the signifier that belongs to the field 
of the Other (“noise” of the racialized Other); second, recognition of the 
structure of this noise (either in tape loops or in study of drumming); finally, 
incorporation of this structure in the sphere of Western classical music as 
means to innovation.5
One of the traces of this dynamic between the internalized otherness 
and innovation in Western canon is evident in the tension between the 
impersonal nature of Reich’s composition and the necessity of the authorial 
function of the composer. In his tape pieces, Reich emphasizes that the 
technique he employs, which the composer designates as “a gradual process,” 
develops independently from its author. Reich writes that the “experience 
of that musical process is, above all else, impersonal; it just goes its way” 
(Reich 2002d: 20, emphasis in the original). This is yet another example 
of an attempt to negate the legacy of Western music characterized by the 
bourgeois individualism that romanticizes the achievement of a single 
composer as the author. Reich proceeds to compare the impersonal nature 
of his gradual process to the non–Western music, making his transference 
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in accepting the racialized Other as the subject who is supposed to know 
apparent; “[i]n African drumming,” he writes, “all the musicians have 
fixed parts, with the exception of the master drummer, who improvises on 
traditional patterns” (Reich 2002: 69). In the discourse on non–Western 
music—in the case of Reich, Balinese Gamelan and West African drum-
ming—indeed, an impersonal character persists in the production of the 
music, and rather than the name of the author, a geographical region or 
the historical context of its production is used to identify the sound (the 
classification that is already a part of the production of Western knowledge); 
in Reich’s own discourse on non–Western music, the name of the tribe is 
the limit of the particular. In case of the Western composer, however, the 
name of the individual author clings to the piece as a necessary structural 
component even at the point when the composer tries to diminish his or her 
own significance; Reich certainly puts his name on the record and collects 
the royalties. What is at stake, however, is not to criticize Reich or to point 
out some kind of hypocrisy and contradiction inherent in his method and 
persona, neither is the point to defend him.6 On the contrary, I insist that 
this apparent contradiction is a manifestation of necessary precondition 
to materialization of the avant–garde subjectivity; this paradoxical duality 
inherent in Reich’s musical composition is yet another manifestation of the 
split induced in alienation in encountering the Other. This split manifests 
itself in the transference with the racialized Other in the insistence of the 
impersonal (non–bourgeois sphere of West African drumming), on the 
one hand, and the necessity of the “complete control” that belongs to the 
authorial “I” (bourgeois individualism of the Western musician) on the other. 
From transference to interpretation
If Reich as the avant–garde composer thus embraces the split constitutive of 
the avant–garde subject, thereby triggering the necessity of transference, it 
becomes increasingly clear that the composer finds the point of transference 
in the very material of his composition–namely, in Daniel Hamm’s voice. 
In contrast to Hamm’s voice, Reich’s position of whiteness is evident: since 
it was the racial motivation that drove the Harlem Six case, the privilege of 
whiteness would not have allowed Reich to be in the position of Hamm. It is 
more than obvious to say that Reich and Hamm occupy a different position 
in the society; but it is also significant to point out that the two occupy dif-
ferent subjective positions, if the subjectivity is constituted by the material 
conditions and the position of embeddedness in the world. Although perhaps 
it is not a position to be desired, Hamm’s subjective embeddedness in the 
world is radically inaccessible to that of the privileged position of whiteness, 
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not merely by choice–e.g., it is not enough to assume an anti–racist stance to 
change one’s subjective position–but by historical contingency. Indeed, while 
Hamm is the victim of police violence and social injustice, he nevertheless 
possess a desirable quality: Hamm holds certain knowledge inaccessible to 
Reich, insofar as he finds himself in the world under a gaze different from 
that of a privileged position of whiteness—the subjective position that Reich 
cannot obtain. If avant–garde’s self–annihilating imperative is to transcend 
the constitutive conditions of its subjectivity, the sphere of what whiteness 
constructs as the Other becomes the desirable sphere of knowledge. 
In this light, the sentence that Reich utilizes in Come Out lends itself to 
musical as well as to semantic interpretation. Having transcribed Hamm’s 
voice, Gopinath points out that it fits Western tonality and scale and, 
therefore, “in excerpting the testimony in a particular way according to his 
aesthetic preferences—and not due to some ‘essential’ musicality of black 
voices—Reich rendered Hamm’s recorded voice in an abstracted, ‘musical’ 
way” (Gopinath 2009:129). The content of the excerpt, however, is no less 
powerful for the composer. The piece repeats the excerpt in its entirety—“I 
had to, like, open the bruise up and let some of the bruise blood come 
out to show them”—only three times; after the initial repetition, it then 
proceeds to loop only the last part of the phrase: “come out to show them.” 
This statement gives a promise “to show.” To show whom?—the police, the 
representatives of the apparatus of whiteness par excellence. To show what? 
That is precisely what Steve Reich is after in his manipulation of Hamm’s 
voice–hence, the transference.
Although Reich excerpts Hamm’s sentence from the interview in which 
Hamm describes the cruelty inflicted on him by the police, the action of the 
police is present in the excerpted sentence only indirectly. The reason that 
Hamm has to “open his bruise up” is that the police were only taking those 
with open wounds to the hospital; Hamm points out that puncturing his 
own skin becomes the only way for him to receive much needed medical 
attention. The entire project of Come Out was initiated by Truman Nelson, 
a white novelist and anti–racist activist, who provided the recordings of the 
interviews to the composer. In addition to creating Come Out, Reich also 
produced a dramatic sound collage out of the interviews, as was originally 
suggested by Nelson. In producing Come Out, however, Reich insisted on 
having a full freedom in using these interviews, despite Nelson’s initial 
disagreement (Gopinath 2009:127). Certainly, Reich’s sympathies lie with 
Hamm in condemnation of the action by the police, which is consistent 
with Wiegman’s articulation of contemporary whiteness as disavowing 
white supremacy. The question however arises, out of hours of interviews 
describing the beating by the police, why does Reich choose the point at 
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which the victim is hurting his own body? This choice may be further tell-
ing of the transferential relation between Reich and the Other. While the 
broader context of the Harlem Six shows the violence done by the system 
in an attempt to subjugate the youths and situate them in a passive position, 
in the excerpt that Reich chooses, Hamm, although hurting himself, is the 
one who is in the position of action. Because the description of the police 
brutality in the narrative of Come Out would turn Hamm into an object of 
violence, this portrayal would preclude the transference with Hamm’s voice 
as the subject who is supposed to know. While this distinction is not a struc-
tural one, it nevertheless further points to the imaginary function central in 
transference. It primarily shows that the composer, although addressing the 
issue of institutionalized injustice and racism inherent in the symbolic order, 
primarily takes interest in his own split. That is, Reich’s Come Out, rather 
than reflecting the narrative of the Harlem Six, first and foremost points to 
the composer’s own vacillation as an avant–garde musician.
Reich’s composition produces the split of Hamm’s voice through playing 
the recording on two different channels, at first in unison and then at slightly 
different speeds. This phasing technique—originally developed in It’s Gonna 
Rain, also in manipulation of a black male voice—at first creates an effect of 
a voice echoing itself, but soon enough, the interval between two channels 
becomes significantly greater and the split becomes perceptible. This point 
marks the introduction of the non–Western patterns in the piece; Gopinath 
notes that the repetition in Come Out shifts from “discursive repetition 
(repetition of phrases or sections, characteristic of many European–derived 
musics of the West) to musematic repetition (immediate repetition of short 
riff or units, particularly common in African–diasporic musics)” (Gopinath 
2009:29). In this change of repetitive patterns, the vacillation of subject 
between Western and non–Western sides of the split becomes apparent in 
the sound produced (thus, also vacillating between “noise” and “music”). 
In manipulating Hamm’s voice Reich exploits the split to its limit: looping 
the recording once again to create a repetition of four voices, and then with 
another loop dividing the recording into eight voices, at which point the 
voice can no longer be heard, vanishing into utter noise. What is the func-
tion of this noise? How can this disintegration of the voice into complete 
chaos be interpreted?
It is in this last part of the piece, when Hamm’s voice becomes completely 
incomprehensible, that Lloyd Whitesell locates the function of whiteness. 
Whitesell says: “The music moves toward an abstract, metaphorical white-
ness, mesmerizing in its unfathomable remoteness from the material black 
vocality of the opening” (177). Whitesell’s critique is predicated on Dyer’s 
claim that in its invisibility, whiteness assumes the position of universality. He 
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says, At the level of racial representation . . . whites are not of a certain race, 
they are just human race” (Dyer 3). Whitesell sees the trend of self–erasure 
in avant–garde movement as a whole; he writes, “in these quests for the 
irreducible background we can see the ideals of ‘art without history’ and 
‘man without qualities’ converging under the sign of racial identity. That is, 
the blank page comes to serve as a medium of white self–representation” 
(175). By the mere token of sounding like background noise, Whitesell 
seems to imply that the music disappears—and by being invisible occupies 
the position of whiteness. 
Does this claim, however, not presuppose and perpetuate the division of 
“music” and “non–music” established by the Western classical (read: white) 
hegemony? Does the minimalist music in its silence and repetition indeed 
disappear? Rather than disguise and disappear, the minimalist aesthetic 
and a piece like Come Out especially, on the contrary, in its conspicuous 
harshness, if anything, renders whiteness particular—even if, as Wiegman 
points out, it does not automatically dislodge it from the privileged position. 
While Whitesell correctly points toward the self–annihilating and reductive 
tendency of the avant–garde, I think that he does not account for the ambi-
guity inherent in this self–erasure—an ambiguity that I have characterized 
as a split in the avant–garde subjectivity. As Groys points out, the reductive 
tendency of the avant–garde art “produces transcendental images, in the 
Kantian sense of the term—images that manifest the conditions for the 
emergence and contemplation of any other image” (6). The avant–garde 
produces transcendental sound in the reduction of its music to noise, in 
order to demonstrate that, as Attali would have it, music is nothing but 
ordered noise and presupposes the exclusion of unordered noise in the first 
place. The avant–garde does not erase itself, but produces self–annihilat-
ing gestures that remain ever present. In this respect, Reich’s Come Out 
articulates the transcendental conditions of music, and does this within the 
context of a benefit show; or, as Groys aptly puts it: “the avant–garde places 
the empirical and transcendental on the same level” (7). In other words, 
what is at stake is not a process of assuming a position of universality, but a 
method of investigating the conditions that make any universality possible 
(transcendental), and rendering these condition as part of the social practice 
(empirical). If the avant–garde’s functional equivalence with whiteness is to 
be admitted, I argue, it does not consist in self–erasure of avant–garde. For 
this self–erasure is of a different order, leaving its own traces in the empirical. 
The structural homology that emerges is to be sought in the transference 
with the racialized Other in order to fill the split of its own subjectivity. It 
is furthermore possible to argue that therein lies the most significant dif-
ference between whiteness and avant–garde: while whiteness perpetuates 
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its privilege by means of disguising the unquestioned presuppositions of its 
privilege in assuming an anti–racist stance, avant–garde first and foremost 
investigates and interrogates its own split, therefore sustaining rather than 
erasing this split. Consequently, while whiteness is at bottom a conservative 
force, avant–garde (while also conservative in respect of perpetuation of 
Western sound) aims at a certain productive surplus evident in its aesthetic 
innovation.
I would like to insist on a different interpretation of Come Out, one that 
stresses the transferential relationship between Reich and Hamm’s statement: 
through repetition, Reich reenacts the movement of alienation in the split 
of the Western avant–garde composer. At the point of transference, the 
subject seeks its desire in the field of the Other who is supposed to know. 
But precisely because the Other’s knowledge is imagined, Lacan points out, 
the subject “will simply find his desire ever more divided, pulverized, in the 
circumscribable metonymy of speech” (188). In other words, just because the 
subject finds signifiers in the Other, these signifiers do not concretely outline 
what the subject must desire. Reich’s studying West African drumming or 
encountering Hamm’s utterance does not clearly define new possibilities in 
music or in the reconstitution of racial subjectivity. Insofar as Come Out 
belongs to Reich’s early work in which he attempts to establish himself as an 
avant–garde composer, his own uncertainty in the face of disappearance as 
a musician is reflected in the choices of the composition. The noise of Come 
Out, which in turn is retroactively to become music, is not characteristic 
of the erasure of whiteness or presence of the Western composer, but of 
their reconstitution in the moment of crisis by means of detour through 
the racialized Other. 
 If the split in the avant–garde subjectivity occurs upon the identification 
with the non–sense signifier (noise), this signifier renders the Western canon 
as not–all–encompassing; consequently, Hamm’s voice, standing for the 
constructed otherness to whiteness (thus also projected onto non–Western 
music) is mutilated by the Western composer: it departs, taking a piece of 
the totality of Western music with it. This split is evident in Reich’s treatment 
of the voice, which he redoubles through phasing—the effect that surfaces 
by means of repetition. Lacan notes that “the endless repetition that is in 
question”— referring to the repetition during transference that acts out the 
gap induced in alienation—“reveals the radical vacillation of the subject” 
(239). This vacillation persists throughout the composition. By the end of the 
first section (at about 2:58 into composition), the words “come out” break 
away from “to show them.” This split does not yet get to the bottom of the 
matter—Reich then takes the split even further by looping the entire thing; 
in this second part, the duality is manifested in a different way, between 
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“come ma–ma–ma” and “to sh–sh–show them” (evident after 4:00). Even 
when the composer redoubles the voices once more, taking Hamm’s enuncia-
tion to radical reduction, thereby rendering it incomprehensible (at 8:37), 
the split endures as an opposition of two phonemes that sound something 
like “tsh” and “c–ma.” This finding illustrates what Lacan designates as the 
function of interpretation; interpretation in transference, Lacan says, “is not 
open to any meaning,” but rather the “effect of interpretation is to isolate in 
the subject a kernel . . . of non–sense” (250). The interpretation targets the 
non–meaning that lies at the root of the emergence of the unconscious—it 
is the cut off signifier that splits the subject in alienation. In Come Out, 
having pursued the signifier in the field of the Other, Reich arrives at noise 
and silence—two phonemes, “tsh” and “c–ma,” and the momentary silence 
that separates them—denoting the movement of the subject between sense 
and impeding non–sense.
It is significant to note that Come Out was Reich’s last tape piece through 
which he discovered new ways of manipulating scores for acoustic Western 
instruments—it allowed him to navigate the split of the avant–garde subjec-
tivity, finally emerging a successful Western classical composer. To attach 
a concrete meaning to the noise that lies behind Reich’s discovery would 
be a mistake and an inconsistency in my argument. Instead, this analysis 
reveals the mechanism by means of which Western music reconstitutes itself 
in the face of its own fading. Rather than a single meaning, the compulsive 
repetition outlines the movement of the subject: first, split with the signi-
fier that emerges in the field of the Other; then, concerning itself with the 
noise of otherness; finally, having internalized the Other—injecting noise 
with meaning—it comes back to itself in a new form. This mechanism 
manifest in Come Out also heralds the development of white subjectivity 
after the 1960s, which turns to non-whites in order to sustain the imaginary 
of itself as anti–racist white subjectivity. This noise as non–sense in Come 
Out, however, does not remain outside of music for long; on the contrary, 
it becomes institutionalized at the point when the composer attaches his 
name to it. Meaning, then, emerges retroactively. For instance, viewed in 
the light of whiteness studies, Whitesell sees the piece as a manifestation of 
white privilege in its disappearance. Gopinath, on the other hand, produces 
a multitude of interpretations made possible by historical contextualization 
of the piece; he maintains that the sound in Come Out, among others, may be 
interpreted as broader violence and paranoia (whether white, black, left or 
Jewish) of the historical period, the aftermath of a riot, interpellation of a lis-
tener as a “cop fighter,” sexualization of black masculinity, or, superimposed 
onto contemporary issues, a composition outlining the “prison–industrial 
complex” (Gopinath 2009:134–9). All of the above interpretations stand 
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contingent on the gaze of the interpreter, making the multitude of interpreta-
tions possible and by no means false—but what is important to point out 
is that these interpretations emerge only after a fundamental suppression 
of what Reich produces as non–sense, after the institutionalization of noise 
as music. While taking interest in racialized Other, the avant–garde subject 
first and foremost betrays the crisis of its own subjectivity, seeking a way to 
reconstitute it. With the arrival of the avant–garde Western composer, the 
lack of ground behind the emerging subjectivity manifested in a gesture to 
negate all such ground becomes the locus of its meanings and serves as the 
condition that grants it the power of fluidity and flexibility.
Notes 
1. The same politically charged and democratic, if not utopian vision rings true in the 
closing words of Reich’s famous essay “Music as a Gradual Process”: “While performing 
and listening to gradual music one can participate in a particular liberating and 
impersonal kind of ritual. Focusing in on the musical process makes possible that shift 
of attention away from he and she and me outwards towards it” (306). Reich gestures 
toward the potential of music as a transformative force, as a force that either changes 
the material conditions of the everyday (benefit concert) or reforms the conditions of 
perception. In his book Experimental Music: Cage and Beyond, while discussing Cage’s 
4’33’’ as exemplary to what he calls “experimental music” (a tradition in which he places 
Reich), Michael Nyman further indicates the prevailing attempt of this tradition to align 
experimental practices in music with life rather than with art, or at least to point toward 
the subversion of this duality: “Henceforward sounds (‘for music, like silence, does not 
exist’ [citing Cage]) would get closer to introducing us to Life, rather than Art, which is 
something separate from Life” (26). While perhaps not the dominant trait of 1960s New 
York avant–garde scene, the discussion of the collapse of “art” and “life” nevertheless 
remains a major topic. 
2. It is necessary to insist that Lacanian field of the Other is a battery of signifiers; it is 
the field of the symbolic order–language, law, cultural codes and so on. Hence, it must be 
understood as the Other of being. The Lacanian Other is therefore not synonymous with 
racial Otherness; but if the Lacanian Other overlaps with racial Otherness, as we shall see 
can be the case, it is due to functional equivalence and is a result of historical contingency 
and not structural necessity.
3. See, for instance, “Interview with Michael Nyman (1970)” or “Postscript to a Brief 
Study of Balinese and African Music (1973).”
4. See, for instance, Gopinath “Steve Reich and Discourse on Non–Western Music.” In 
this article, Gopinath suggests that Reich’s knowledge of these patterns may be traced 
back to A.M. Jones’s Studies.
5. The temporality of these events must be understood in terms of logical causality, 
and not linear causality. In other words, although I point to certain steps as logical 
presuppositions to one another, it does not mean that they must be understood 
diachronically, that is, happning one after another in a temporal order; rather, the 
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temporality is one of synchrony. For this reason it is justified to claim, as Gopinath 
argues, that in transcribing West African drumming, Reich “constructed” and not merely 
“discovered” the aforementioned rhythmical structures (see “Steve Reich and Discourse 
on Non–Western Music”). Nevertheless, I maintain, that all the aforementioned steps are 
logical necessities, which exemplify the constitution of the avant–garde subjectivity. 
6. Furthermore, Reich himself is more than ready to acknowledge the tension of the 
authorial and the impersonal; in his “Music as a Gradual Process,” Reich writes: 
“Musical processes can give one a direct contact with the impersonal and also a kind 
of complete control . . . I completely control all the results, but also . . . I accept all that 
result without changes” (305). It is clear that one must not be logically consistent in order 
to produce music.
References
Attali, Jacques. 2004. Listening. Hearing History: A Reader. ed. Smith, Mark M. Athens: 
University of Georgia Press.
Baldwin, James. 1966. A Report from Occupied Territory. The Nation (11 July).
Bürger, Peter. 1984. Theory of the Avant–Garde. Theory and history of literature. Trans. Michael 
Shaw. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Dyer, Richard. 1997. White. London: Routledge.
Gopinath, Sumanth. 2009. The Problem of the Political in Steve Reich’s Come Out. In Sound 
Commitments: avant–garde Music and the Sixties. ed. Adlington, Robert. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
___. 2001. Steve Reich and Discourse on Non–Western Music. Glendora Review. (3.3,4 ): 
134–145. 
Groys, Boris. 2010. The Weak Universalism. E–Flux Journal. 15. <http://www.e–flux.com/>.
Karatani, Kojin. 1995. Architecture As Metaphor: Language, Number, Money. In Writing 
Architecture. Michael Speaks, ed. Trans. Sabu Kohso.. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.
Lacan, Jacques. 1981. The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho–Analysis. Trans. Alan 
Sheridan. New York: Norton.
Nyman, Michael. 1999. Experimental Music: Cage and Beyond. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Reich, Steve. 2002a. First Interview with Michael Nyman (1970). Writings on Music, 
1965–2000. ed. Hillier, Paul. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
___. 2004. Music as a Gradual Process. Audio Culture: Readings in Modern Music. ed. Cox, 
Christoph, and Daniel Warner. New York: Continuum.
___. 2002b. Non–Wesetern Music and the Western Composer (1988). Writings on Music, 
1965–2000. ed. Hillier, Paul. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
___. 2002c. Postscript to a Brief Study of Balinese and African Music (1973). Writings on 
Music, 1965–2000. ed. Hillier, Paul. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
___. 2002d. It’s Gonna Rain. Writings on Music,. ed. Hillier, Paul. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.
___. 2002e. It’s Gonna Rain. Writings on Music, 1965–2000. ed. Hillier, Paul. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.
Whitesell, Lloyd. 2001. White Noise: Race and Erasure in the Cultural Avant–Garde. American 
Music (19. 2): 168–189.
Wiegman, Robyn. 1999. Whiteness Studies and the Paradox of Particularity. boundary 2, 
26, no. 3 (Fall): 115–150. 

